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Freedom to Strike? What Freedom to Strike? Back-to-Work
Legislation and the Freedom to Strike in Historical and
Legal Perspective
Eric Tucker, York University
Defenders of labour rights rightly criticize the enactment of back-to-work
(btw) legislation ending otherwise lawful strikes as egregious interference with
the freedom to strike, a freedom that in 2015 the Supreme Court of Canada
(scc) held is constitutionally protected.1 Yet, often overlooked in discussions
of the freedom to strike and the propensity of neoliberal governments to limit
that freedom through exceptional measures is the baseline of restrictions built
into the dna of Canada’s version of the Wagner Act Model (wam) of collective
bargaining.2 Te frst goal of this essay, therefore, is to locate btw measures
in the longer history and current practice of legally restricting the freedom to
strike. Te second goal is to consider the extent to which the constitutional
freedom to strike is likely to modify the legal framework generally and to limit
the use of btw measures in particular.

The Legal Regulation of the Freedom to Strike
Te non-constitutional framework regulating the freedom to strike has three
strands: the constitutive liberal order framework of the common law; the
industrial pluralist framework for private-sector bargaining (the wam); and
public-sector and essential-service collective bargaining laws. Together, these
strands produce a legal regime that narrowly restricts workers’ freedom to
strike.
The Constitutive Liberal Order of the Common Law
To begin at the beginning, it is essential to recognize that collective action by
workers in capitalist social formations runs against the grain of their foundational commitment to a liberal order founded on individualism. Ian McKay
helpfully defnes this order as “one that encourages and seeks to extend across
time and space a belief in the epistemological and ontological primacy of the
1. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 scc 4, [2015] scr 245.
2. Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz coined the term “permanent exceptionalism” to
characterize this development. Panitch & Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: Te Assault
on Trade Union Freedoms, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Garamond, 2003). On the history of Canadian
Wagnerism, see Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 2001); Peter S. McInnis, Harnessing Labour Confrontation (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002).
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category ‘individual.’”3 Te liberal order framework does not entail a formal
legal constitutional commitment but rather is constitutive in the sense that
it embeds a foundational ideological commitment that shapes but does not
determine the formal legal response to worker collective action.
Te constitutive commitment to individualism privileges individual rights
and freedoms, including the right to private property and freedom of contract.
Te individual as property owner enjoys the right to exclude, freedom to use,
privilege to transfer, and immunity from taking. Within broad limits, property
owners can use their property as they see ft without regard to its impact on
anyone else. As sovereign individuals, they are also free to contract with other
sovereign individuals, on terms and conditions they fnd mutually agreeable.
Individuals within the liberal order framework are formally equal, but historically the liberal order framework did not apply universally to all those within
its territorial boundaries. Enslaved and Indigenous peoples, for example, were
liable to have their labour and lands taken, without their consent and without
compensation.4
Te liberal order framework does not exist in the abstract but rather is
located in capitalist social formations, characterized by private ownership of
the means of production by the few, the capitalists. Te many sovereign individuals who own only their own labour power, the workers, are dependent on
its sale. Te liberal order framework recognizes workers as equal sovereign
individuals who are free to sell their labour power to other property owners
on mutually agreeable terms. However, it ignores the structural advantages
enjoyed by the owners of capital in the bargaining game. Capitalists can
exercise their ownership rights to decide whether to invest, what to produce,
where to produce, how much to produce, and how many workers to hire.
Workers lack the means to survive for long outside the labour market and thus
are dependent on fnding a capitalist willing to hire them, while competing
against other, equally dependent workers. Teir abstract freedom is signifcantly constrained by their material circumstances.
Because the liberal order is committed to the formal equality of sovereign
individuals, it starts from the premise that employers and workers should only
bargain with each other individually. Combinations of workers to improve the
terms and conditions of their employment are anticompetitive and contrary to
the notion of individualism.
Of course, in reality, the commitment to individualism is not absolute. Te
law allows wealth owners to combine through the vehicle of the corporation,
but it masks the collective character of capital by treating the corporation as
3. Ian McKay, “Te Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian
History,” Canadian Historical Review 81, 4 (2000): 624.
4. Nancy Fraser, “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography—From Exploitation to
Expropriation: Historic Geographies of Racialized Capitalism,” Economic Geography 94, 1
(2018): 1–17.
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a legal person that can participate in the market just like any fesh-and-blood
human individual.5 However, the law does not ofer workers an equivalent
vehicle. Quite the opposite. Historically, common law judges and early 19thcentury English legislation treated worker combinations as criminal or civil
conspiracies, or both.6
Te above describes the liberal order framework as an ideal type, but it
should not be taken as an accurate depiction of how actually existing liberal
orders functioned. Workers often rejected the order’s legal prescriptions,
let alone its ideological tenets, and engaged in collective actions to advance
their common interests. When conditions were favourable, Canadian workers
formed trade unions, struck for better terms and conditions, and watched
and beset (picketed) their employers’ businesses or boycotted their businesses
and those of their employers’ suppliers or distributers, notwithstanding the
dubious legality of such actions. From time to time, the state responded with
coercive measures, ranging from reading the riot act and calling out the militia
or the police to disperse crowds to prosecuting individual workers for various
criminal ofences. As well, the law ofered their employers legal remedies,
including court-issued injunctions and damage awards that the state could
be called upon to enforce. Te liberal order framework rationalized all these
coercive measures as ones necessary to defend individual sovereignty, but
workers experienced these actions as the iron fst of class justice. Te failure of
the liberal order framework to achieve hegemonic status, and the unwillingness of governments consistently to mount the coercion necessary to impose
it, ultimately meant that workers enjoyed a de facto freedom to form unions
and strike, which the law begrudgingly recognized over time, focusing instead
on restricting what workers could do to make their strikes efective.7 Indeed,
it would be fair to say that the very failure of the liberal order framework to
contain industrial confict pushed governments to experiment with reforms
that would do a better job.
Te story of those struggles and the legal changes they produced has been
told elsewhere.8 Yet despite these changes, the ideological hold of the liberal
order framework has never been entirely loosened and continues to infuence
the permissible scope of workers’ collective action.

5. Harry Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002).
6. John V. Orth, Combination and Conspiracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
7. Eric Tucker, “‘Tat Indefnite Zone of Toleration’: Criminal Conspiracy and Trade Unions
in Ontario, 1837–1877,” Labour/Le Travail 27 (Spring 1991): 15–54; Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker,
“Te Freedom to Strike in Canada: A Brief Legal History,” Canadian Labour and Employment
Law Journal 15, 2 (2010): 333–353.
8. Barry Eidlin, Labor and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018); Fudge & Tucker, Labour Before the Law; McInnis,
Harnessing.
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Industrial Pluralism: The WAM Restrictions on the Freedom to Strike
Te industrial pluralist order was entrenched in Canada at the end of World
War II in the face of a massive display of worker militancy. Te wam was the
state’s legal response, designed to facilitate a particular kind of responsible
unionism and decentralized collective bargaining that would bring workers
some amelioration, while providing employers with assurances that workers’
collective power would be contained and disruptions of production allowed
in limited circumstances. Te so-called accord entailed restrictions on the
freedom to strike but also provided workers with certain rights, including a
limited right to strike.
Te restrictions on the freedom to strike were (and are) severe, prohibiting
recognition strikes, strikes during the life of a collective agreement, political
strikes, solidarity strikes, strikes before the parties have undergone conciliation and a cooling-of period, strikes not yet approved by a strike vote, and,
in some jurisdictions, strikes before the union has given the employer timely
notice. In short, workers seeking to unionize or who are unionized are prohibited from striking, or threatening to strike, except during the negotiation
of collective agreements and then only after certain procedures have been followed. Te penalties for engaging in unlawful strikes are quite severe. Labour
boards are empowered to declare strikes unlawful and order them to end.
Tese orders are enforceable by courts, which can hold unions and ofcials in
contempt, exposing the union to fnes and ofcials to fnes and jail.9 Employers
can bring grievances against the union and claim damages. Tey can also
discipline individual workers who participate in unlawful strikes, including
termination, depending on the circumstances. In short, the wam created the
most restrictive and efective regime of strike controls in Canadian history.
What then is “pluralist” about such a repressive regime? Te answer, briefy,
is that it gave workers a set of rights in lieu of freedoms taken from them,
including the following:
9. For example, in September 2019, workers at the Nemak plant in Windsor went on a
wildcat strike and put up a barricade in front of the plant after it announced it was going to
close and move its operations to Mexico. Te union, Unifor, supported these actions. Te
employer obtained a declaration from the labour board and then sought its enforcement in
court. Te judge endorsed the board’s order, but when the strike did not end, the employer
applied to have the union and its leaders held in contempt. Te judge gave the union a day to
end the strike but when it failed to do so, the judge fned the union $75,000 plus an additional
$10,000 fne for each day the strike continued. Te judge also imposed a $1,000-a-day fne
on four union ofcials involved. Within 48 hours the union reached an agreement with
the employer calling for some brief negotiations, which would be followed by expedited
grievance arbitration (limited to whether the employer’s action violated the collective
agreement). Te employer also agreed not to discipline the workers who had participated
in the strike. In short, the union returned to the fold of industrial legality, with little, if
anything, to show for it. Trevor Wilhelm, “Protest against Nemak Ends, Unifor Members
Return to Work,” Windsor Star, 16 September 2019, https://windsorstar.com/news/local-news/
protest-against-nemak-ends-unifor-members-return-to-work.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2020.0042
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• a right to recognition, if they could establish majority support for
unionization;
• a right to arbitration to resolve disputes over the interpretation and application of the collective agreement; and
• a right to maintain employment status while on strike and to be reinstated
at its termination, within a limited time period.
It should be noted that, strictly speaking, the last right – protection of employment status – is not directly a substitute for a restriction on the freedom to
strike but rather a right that protects the exercise of what remains of the
freedom to strike.
Te pluralist regime was the outcome of intense class struggle and strike
waves that employers and the state could not control by repressive measures
alone. Tis forced the state to construct a system of labour relations that
did not just restrict industrial confict but provided unionized workers with
industrial citizenship rights. More importantly, the regime operated during
a period of unprecedented economic growth and stability, in which unionized workers shared by having wages linked to productivity increases and from
modest Keynesian welfare-state measures.10 While workers did not accept the
restrictions of the regime at all times and in all places, as evidenced by bouts
of wildcat striking, it achieved a hegemonic status that had eluded the liberal
order regime.11
Essential-Service Restrictions
Overlaid on the pluralist regime restrictions were a second set of restrictions
justifed on the ground of an overriding public interest in preventing strikes
when they created an immediate danger to public security, health and safety,
or, more controversially, the economy.12 We can trace the safety and security
restrictions to the late 19th century, shortly after workers gained the formal
freedom to strike. In the aftermath of a railway strike that left passengers
stranded on trains between stations, the federal government enacted a law
that abolished criminal prosecution for workers’ breach of their contracts
of employment, which had been a major feature of the master-and-servant
10. For a discussion that emphasizes the limits of Keynesian policy during this era, see Fletcher
Baragar, “Teory, Policy and Institutional Structure: pc 1003 and Macroeconomics,” in Cy
Gonick, Paul Phillips & Jesse Vorst, eds., Labour Gains, Labour Pains: Fifty Years of pc 1003
(Winnipeg: Society for Socialist Studies, 1995), 39–57.
11. Overall, between 1960 and 2004, 18 percent of strikes were wildcats. Linda Briskin, “Public
Sector Militancy, Feminization, and Employer Aggression,” in Sjaak van der Velden, Heiner
Dribbusch, Dave Lyddon & Kurt Vandaele, eds., Strikes around the World: Case-Studies of 15
Countries (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2007), 86, 95–96.
12. Eric Tucker, “Regulating Essential Service Strikes in Canada,” in Moti Mironi & Monika
Schlachter, eds., Regulating Strikes in Essential Services: A Comparative ‘Law in Action’
Perspective (Alphen aan den Rijn, Te Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2018), 107–144.
Tucker
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regime that predated the liberal order. However, it also enacted legislation
making it a crime to breach a contract knowing that a likely consequence
would be to endanger human life, cause serious injury, or expose valuable
property to destruction. Tis could potentially apply to strikers, since quitting
work without giving notice was a breach of contract. However, for the breach
to be criminal, there also had to be knowledge of the strike’s consequences.13
We can trace the impulse to restrict the freedom to strike in the name
of protecting the economy to the federal government’s Industrial Disputes
Investigation Act of 1907.14 Te act required unions and employers to resort
to conciliation before exercising their freedom to strike or lockout, but it only
applied to those sectors of the economy seen to have a signifcant impact on
the economy, including public utilities, railways, and mines. Governments
subsequently incorporated this restriction into the wam, so that it limits the
freedom to strike generally.
When the state adopted the wam at the end of World War II, it generally
enacted additional restrictions on the freedom to strike to protect essential
services. Tis was because most Canadian governments did not extend the
wam to the public and para-public sectors, and the private sector generally
did not provide essential services, narrowly conceived, although there were
some exceptions, such as railway workers, as Charles Smith’s contribution to
this roundtable demonstrates. As well, some public-sector workers, such as
municipal transit and sanitation workers, whose services could be viewed as
essential in some contexts, were included in private-sector collective bargaining laws and therefore faced the wam’s “normal” restrictions on the freedom
to strike. Municipal police and frefghters also secured collective bargaining
rights, but they were not included in general labour relations acts. Rather, the
state enacted dedicated statutes that completely deprived these workers of the
freedom to strike. Instead, collective bargaining disputes were to be resolved
through binding-interest arbitration by a neutral third party. Tis was the
beginning of the no-strike model for essential services.
Te need to consider further restrictions on the freedom to strike in the
name of protecting essential services grew substantially in the late 1960s when
governments extended collective bargaining to the public and para-public
sector more broadly. Two key issues needed to be resolved: the defnition of
essential services and the method to protect them. A full survey of responses
is not possible, but in broad terms, the two most common responses were the
no-strike model, discussed above, and the designation model, or controlled
strike model. Te basic premise of the controlled strike model is that essential
13. Te law was subsequently amended so that it did not apply to workers engaging in a lawful
strike. Tis is largely superfuous since workers who strike legally do not breach their contract
of employment. Te law – “criminal breach of contract” – is still on the books. Criminal Code,
Rsc 1985, c C-46, s 422.
14. Bob Russell, Back to Work? (Scarborough, ON: Nelson, 1990).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2020.0042
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services must be maintained during a strike. In general terms, this objective is
achieved by requiring the parties to negotiate an essential-services agreement,
which sets out which services are essential and the level at which they must
be provided during a strike. Normally, essential-service laws also provide that
if the scope of the designation is so great as to render the strike inefective,
workers can access interest arbitration to resolve the dispute.
Some governments also adopted the so-called unfettered strike model
(essentially the wam), typically for workers who were not providing essential
services in the strict sense of the term, such as postal workers and teachers
and, as mentioned earlier, civic and local transit workers. Of course, the unfettered strike model contained all the wam fetters on the freedom to strike,
but it did not add any additional ones. However, this model, as well as the
controlled strike model, was backstopped by the power of government to end
otherwise legal strikes by back-to-work measures, which could take the form
of legislation or, in some jurisdictions, executive orders.
Te power to use btw measures was not new, but governments had rarely
exercised it prior to the 1970s.15 Tat began to change after para-public-sector
workers such as teachers and hospital workers (in some provinces) gained the
freedom to strike. In most cases, when governments ended lawful strikes by
btw measures, they substituted binding-interest arbitration by a neutral third
party. Between 1950 and 1974, which captures the era before the neoliberal
turn (and mostly before the widespread extension of collective bargaining
to the public and para-public sectors), governments took btw measures 32
times, or about 1.3 times a year.16
To summarize, by the early 1970s Canadian workers enjoyed a very cramped
freedom to strike. Private-sector workers could only strike when no collective bargaining agreement was in force and after they had followed prescribed
procedures. Public- and para-public-sector workers’ freedom to strike was
even more constrained. Some were deprived entirely of the freedom to strike,
others could engage in controlled strikes that signifcantly undermined their
bargaining leverage, while others were notionally free to strike but liable to
be legislated back to work if the government in power perceived the resulting
disruption to be unacceptable.
Back-to-Work Legislation under Permanent Exceptionalism
Tat was the apogee. In the mid- to late 1970s, Canadian governments
began to take the neoliberal turn that, in the area of collective bargaining,
produced what Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz characterized as “permanent exceptionalism,” imposing greater restrictions on workers’ freedom to
15. For examples, see Smith’s discussion (in this volume) of the frst btw law, used to end a
strike by 125,000 railway and telegraph workers in 1950.
16. Calculated from Panitch & Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, Table 8, 184.
Tucker
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strike.17 Governments achieved this result in a variety of ways. Beginning in
the mid-1970s, governments began resorting to wage controls that stripped
afected workers of the freedom to strike for the duration of those controls.18
Another, less direct way of restricting the freedom to strike was by expanding
the number of bargaining units that were designated as providing essential
services and/or by enlarging the number of workers required to maintain
essential services. Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this
roundtable, governments markedly increased their use of btw measures in
the second half of the 1970s and continued doing so, with some fuctuations,
until the early 2000s.19 From 1975 to 2002, governments resorted to btw measures 115 times, or about 3.2 times a year. Looking more narrowly, from 1982
to 2002, governments enacted restrictive labour laws about 6 times per year.20
Government use of btw measures and restrictive labour laws has declined
in frequency since that time. Between 2003 and 2014, btw measures were
used a total of 15 times – or, on average, a little more than once a year, which
is close to the frequency seen before the neoliberal turn – while restrictive
labour laws were enacted fewer than 4 times per year.21 One major reason for
this decrease is the sharp decline in strike frequency and days lost to strikes,
beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing to the present, so that strikes are
as infrequent now as they were any at any point in the 20th century.22

Back-to-Work Legislation and the Constitutional Right to Strike
Some might suggest that another reason for the decline in government’s use
of btw measures is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However,
that would be incorrect. Te scc only recognized in 2015, in the Saskatchewan
Federation of Labour (sfl) case, that workers enjoyed a constitutionally protected freedom to strike. Prior to that time, the court had steadfastly insisted
that section 2(d) of the Charter, which protects freedom of association, did not
17. Panitch & Swartz, From Consent to Coercion.
18. For a discussion, see the essay by Christo Aivalis in this volume.
19. Panitch & Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, Table 8, 184.
20. Calculated from Canadian Foundation for Labour Rights, “Restrictive Labour Laws in
Canada,” accessed 25 May 2019, https://labourrights.ca/issues/restrictive-labour-laws-canada
(hereafter cflr database).
21. Calculated from Panitch & Swartz, From Consent to Coercion; cflr database.
22. Jordan Brennan, “Canadian Labour Disputes, Wage Growth and Infation, 1903–2016,”
chart in Jason Kirby, “Te 91 Most Important Economic Charts to Watch in 2018,” Maclean’s,
5 December 2017, https://www.macleans.ca/economy/economicanalysis/the-most-importanteconomic-charts-to-watch-in-2018/#jordanbrennan. Also, see Eric Tucker, “Can Worker Voice
Strike Back? Law and the Decline and Uncertain Future of Strikes,” in Alan Bogg & Tonia
Novitz, eds., Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 455–473.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2020.0042
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protect the freedom to strike.23 Hence, the decline in btw measures between
2002 and 2014 could not possibly have been the result of constitutional protection. Moreover, since the date of the sfl judgement (30 January 2015),
governments have enacted btw legislation fve times, or at a rate similar to
that of the period between 2002 and 2014. Of course, it is possible that were it
not for the sfl decision, governments would have resorted to btw legislation
more frequently, but that is unknown.
Tis leads us to the question of the extent to which the constitutional protection of the freedom to strike limits government use of btw measures, as
well as other restrictions on the freedom to strike.24 At the time of writing, no
constitutional challenge to post-sfl btw measures have reached the courts.25
However, a challenge to the federal government’s 2011 btw legislation targeting postal workers was decided in 2016 and so, based on this case, and on the
sfl decision itself, we can discuss in general terms the constitutional limits on
btw measures.
Te general test to determine the constitutionality of legislation that interferes with the freedom to strike is “whether the legislative interference with
the right to strike in a particular case amounts to substantial interference
with collective bargaining.”26 To determine whether there has been substantial interference, the court asks whether there has been a disruption of the
balance between employer and employees. Te scc articulated some of the
ways laws might disrupt that balance, including laws that “ban recourse to collective action without adequate countervailing protections.”27 Te sfl case did
not involve btw legislation but rather provincial legislation that aggressively
regulated essential-service strikes without providing a dispute resolution
mechanism in the event that designations deprived workers of an efective
ability to strike. By implication, btw legislation that completely deprived
workers of the freedom to strike would be prima facie unconstitutional.
Te postal workers’ case challenged btw legislation that imposed fnal ofer
selection (fos) to resolve outstanding diferences, except for wage increases
and the length of the agreement, which were set by statute.28 At the time,
Canadian courts had not recognized a constitutional right to strike and so the
23. Tis goes back to the frst trilogy of labour rights cases, decided in 1987.
24. For further refections on this issue, see Alison Braley-Rattai’s essay in this volume.
25. Te implications of the length of time delay between the use of btw measures and a
judicial determination of their constitutionality is an important consideration when assessing
their efcacy.
26. sfl, para. 78.
27. sfl, para. 78, citing an earlier scc judgment: Mounted Police Association of Ontario v
Canada (Attorney General) 2015 scc 1, [2015] 1 scr, para 90.
28. Restoring Mail Delivery for Canadians Act, sc 2011, c17; Canadian Union of Postal
Workers v Her Majesty in Right of Canada, 2016 onsc 418 (hereafter cupw).
Tucker
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federal government would not have considered that its legislation was vulnerable to a successful constitutional challenge. However, when the parties argued
the case in October 2015, the constitutional landscape had changed and the
principal question before the court was whether this btw legislation violated
the workers’ constitutionally protected freedom to strike.
Based on the court’s judgment, it is likely that all btw legislation prima
facie violates Charter-protected freedom of association. Te court specifcally
rejected the proposition that a law enacted following a lengthy period of collective bargaining and work stoppages would be valid: “Tere is no support
for a temporal limit on the right to strike. … Nor is there any support for the
proposition that the right to strike, once engaged (as long as it is contributing
to a meaningful process of collective bargaining) can be taken away without a
s. 2(d) violation.”29
While one might construct a hypothetical situation in which a strike is no
longer contributing to a meaningful process of collective bargaining, it seems
far-fetched. Te other issue, not addressed by the court, is whether it would
uphold btw legislation that provided “adequate countervailing protections.”
We will briefy consider the implications of that formulation for the constitutionality of the “standard” restrictions on the freedom to strike built into
the wam and public-sector collective bargaining law, but in the context of
btw measures, it is hard to imagine what countervailing protection would be
adequate. For example, the substitution of binding-interest arbitration for the
freedom to strike does not protect the countervailing power generated by the
collective withdrawal of labour but simply eliminates countervailing power
from the equation, leaving it to the arbitrator to settle the dispute based on
criteria such as comparability.30
Tat being the case, it is probably fair to assume that all btw measures will
be found in violation of the right to strike and the question will be whether
those measures can be justifed under section 1 as “demonstrably justifed in
a free and democratic society.” Tis requires the government to establish on a
balance of probabilities that (1) it had a pressing and substantial objective; (2)
its actions were rationally connected to the achievement of those objectives;
(3) the rights-infringing measures minimally impaired the afected right; and
(4) the harmful efects of the measure do not outweigh its benefts. How might
a section 1 analysis play out in the context of btw measures?
To begin, with regard to the frst branch of a section 1 analysis, the court
in the postal workers’ case expressly rejected the argument that only the
29. cupw, para. 185.
30. Tere is, however, evidence that arbitrators award a wage premium in compulsory
arbitration, which cannot be explained by the bargaining power of the workers deprived of
the right to strike. See Michele Campolieti, Robert Hebdon & Benjamin Dachis, “Collective
Bargaining in the Canadian Public Sector, 1978–2008: Te Consequences of Restraint and
Structural Change,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 54, 1 (2016): 192–213.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2020.0042
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protection of essential services could satisfy the “pressing and substantial
objective” criterion. Tis was crucial because postal services are not essential in the strict sense of the term and governments have not treated them
as such legislatively. Te court’s broader conception of pressing and substantial objectives permits governments’ successfully arguing that btw measures
preventing signifcant disruptions to non-essential services or to the broader
economy can be demonstrably justifed.
Te rational connection test is unlikely to be an issue, since btw measures
achieve the goal of ending the disruption. Tus, the minimal impairment
requirement will be the crucial site of dispute, and it was at this stage that government lost its case in both sfl and the postal workers litigation. Te problem
in the sfl case was that the legislation gave the employer unilateral authority
to determine whether and how to maintain essential services, with no review
mechanism, and further, that it failed to provide a meaningful dispute resolution mechanism to resolve bargaining impasses, features normally present in
Canadian essential-service strike laws. In the postal workers’ case, the law provided an arbitration mechanism but tilted it in favour of the employer. Most
fundamentally, the tabling of btw legislation itself “created and exacerbated
an imbalance between the parties that had not existed before the legislation
was tabled.”31 Tis holding is potentially devastating to any section 1 defence
of btw measures since it is difcult to imagine what substitute could address
the resulting loss of union bargaining power. I suspect, therefore, that the test
for minimum impairment will focus on whether the loss of the freedom to
strike is “balanced by access to a system which is capable of resolving in a
fair, efective, expeditious manner disputes which arise between employers
and employees.”32
Te problem with the government’s section 1 argument in the 2011 postal
workers’ legislation was that the law imposed a mandatory wage increase,
set the term of the agreement, and allowed the appointment of an arbitrator
without consultation with the parties. Federal government lawyers no doubt
had a careful eye on this judgement when they drafted Bill C-89, the btw
law ending the 2018 postal workers’ job action. In particular, the law provided
for the parties to each submit the names of three acceptable arbitrators. If
there were no common nominees, the chair of the Canada Industrial Relations
Board was to arbitrate. All matters in dispute were to be resolved by arbitration and the act stipulated a set of principles to guide the arbitrator, including
the major concerns raised by the union (health and safety; equal pay; fair
treatment of temporary and part-time employees) and the employer (fnancial
stability; culture of collaboration; high-quality service at a reasonable price).33
31. cupw, para. 212.
32. Reference Re Public Service Employees Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 scr 313 at 380
(Dickson) cited in sfl at para. 94.
33. Postal Services Resumption and Continuation Act, sc 2018, c 25.
Tucker
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Based on the thin body of case law to date, there is little doubt in my mind
that a court would fnd this legislation minimally impairing in the event that
the union pursues its challenge. If I am correct, there is a signifcant likelihood
that well-designed btw measures, of the kind that were typical before 2015,
will likely pass constitutional muster. Only the more draconian variations will
be constitutionally out of bounds.
While this essay has focused on btw measures, it is worth considering
whether the restriction on the freedom to strike embedded in the wam and
public-sector collective bargaining laws violates workers’ constitutionally protected freedom to strike. In principle, the courts could fnd that all of these
restrictions are unconstitutional, but that result is unlikely for two reasons.
First, as long as the courts view the restrictions as reasonable ones that still
allow collective bargaining to occur, they are unlikely to hold that the measures “substantially” interfere with collective bargaining. Second, even if the
courts were prepared to hold that the measures do substantially interfere, as
long as the substitute for the freedom to strike is viewed as reasonable, then
the court is likely to fnd it demonstrably justifed under a section 1 analysis.
For example, the procedural hurdles to conducting a lawful strike, such as
conciliation or a strike vote, are almost certain to pass constitutional muster,
unless they are designed to create a signifcant barrier to holding a lawful
strike, as is the case in Australia and the United Kingdom. 34 Similarly, the prohibitions on recognitions and midterm strikes are likely to survive because the
substitution of administrative recognition and grievance arbitration are now
woven into the fabric of Canadian collective bargaining law and practice. I
also expect that courts will uphold the constitutionality of the no-strike model
for police and frefghters and other public-safety workers, provided the alternative is arbitration or fos by a neutral third party. A court might have more
reservations about broader applications of the no-strike model to groups such
as the Toronto transit workers, even with otherwise acceptable substitutes, but
that would depend on its view of the state’s legitimate interest in preventing a
labour disruption.35 In fact, the government of Alberta responded to the sfl
judgment by replacing the no-strike model for government workers with the
designated strike model, believing that the normative designated strike model
would pass constitutional muster.36

34. Breen Creighton, Catrina Denvir, Richard Johnstone & Shae McCrystal, “Protected
Industrial Action Ballots: An Empirical View,” Journal of Industrial Relations 60, 1 (2018): 53–
76; Tonia Novitz, “UK Regulation of Strike Ballots and Notices – Moving beyond ‘Democracy,’”
Australian Journal of Labour Law 29 (2016): 226–242.
35. Toronto Transit Commission Labour Disputes Resolution Act, 2011, so 2011, c 2.
36. Tellingly, the act was entitled An Act to Implement a Supreme Court Ruling Governing
Essential Services (sa 2016, c 10).
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Conclusion
Starting with the liberal order framework and continuing through industrial
pluralism and its extension to the public sector, Canadian labour law has taken
a dim view of strike activity and adopted measures to contain its frequency
and efcacy. btw legislation is only one of the many ways that the freedom
to strike is restricted in Canada. Te wam model itself incorporates the most
wide-sweeping restrictions on the freedom to strike in Canadian history, while
additional restrictions are imposed on workers providing public services,
including a complete ban (the no-strike model) or a partial ban (the designation or controlled strike model). btw measures are reserved for workers who
lawfully exercise their legal freedom to strike in the rare moments when they
can. However, governments may revoke even this limited legal freedom if it
views the resulting disruption as unacceptable.
Te constitutional freedom to strike, recognized by the scc in 2015, is
unlikely to upend Canada’s restrictive strike laws. Rather, it is more likely to
valorize them, while restraining governments from engaging in ‘excess’ repression of the freedom to strike, by which I mean state measures that are outside
the existing, restrictive norms of industrial legality. In an era of growing government intolerance of organized labour, and in which we are witnessing the
rise of authoritarian neoliberal modes of governance, this is no small protection, but the constitutional right to strike is unlikely to provide workers with
greater legal freedoms than those they were once able to force government to
recognize by their own eforts.37

37. Alan Bogg, “Beyond Neo-Liberalism: Te Trade Union Act 2016 and the Authoritarian
State,” Industrial Law Journal 45, 3 (2016): 299–336.
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